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In March 1950, the French Communist Party (PCF) urged Marseilles dockers to 
strike to protest the handling of weapons for the Indochina war and NATO.1 French 
labor historian Michel Pigenet comments that the action showed the highest degree of 
confusion between party and trade union objectives and practices and led to a 
weakening of the Confédération générale du travail’s (CGT) Fédération des Ports et 
Docks.2 The incident is part of a long and tortuous history of Communist work in the 
trade unions. The purpose of this paper is to examine different facets of this policy 
through five strike episodes concerning dock workers in Le Havre between 1920 and 
1970 (1922, 1928, 1936, 1945-46 and 1968). 
Let us first situate France roughly in the spectrum of Communist parties and 
their trade-union influence in the world. When the United Socialist Party changed its 
name to Communist Party at the Tours Congress in 1920, Communists were very 
influential in the CGT, the historic and organic labor federation where they and their 
revolutionary syndicalist allies faced a reformist leadership not quite sure that it still had 
a majority. In France, trade-union influence is customarily measured not by dues-paying 
membership but by electoral results in “social elections” (trade union delegate, social 
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 In this paper, we use the French term « dockers » (derived from the English « dock ») rather than the 
more common English « dockworkers » or US “longshoremen”. 
2
 In « Les voies et les facteurs de l’unité organique : les syndicats des Ports et Docks dans la seconde 
moitié du XXe siècle » [Colloque ihs-cgt.fr 2007 Montreuil], Michel Pigenet (CHS XXe siècle) writes :  
“La confusion est flagrante entre 1949 et 1952, lorsque le PCF pousse les militants des Ports et Docks à 
des actions « concrètes » avant-gardistes contre la guerre d’Indochine et l’OTAN (22). »… « Partout, la 
Fédération sort affaiblie d’un combat dont les dockers réalisent bientôt qu’ils ont été les seuls à le mener 
directement sur leur lieu de travail. » 
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security, labor courts) and the ability to mobilize in strikes or demonstrations.3 After 
some losses in the 1920s, the PCF-supported unions became dominant around 1935 for 
sixty years or more, followed loosely by 40% to 60% of wage earners, with a peak 
between 1944 and 1976. In some industries, the PCF-influenced unions were the chief 
negotiators in collective bargaining for decades. This was the case in the cargo handling 
sector after 1936 in several French ports, but not in Le Havre. 
In the port of Le Havre, the dockers’ union was led between 1920 and 1970 by 
teams which identified with a particular brand of revolutionary syndicalism that began 
as militant anarcho-syndicalism in the early years and had become non-political trade 
unionism by the 1970s. Over the years, this union leadership entertained varying 
relations with the local Communist Party and national Fédération des Ports et Docks, 
influenced by the PCF (thanks to its support in other ports like Marseilles). A case study 
of Le Havre during five major strikes enables us to consider PCF trade union policy 
both in the national framework where it was often dominant, and in an exceptional local 
configuration where it acted as a minority in a strong union dominated by non-
Communists.  
Our purpose here is to highlight the main features of Communist policy on 
strikes based on a review of existing literature on dockers, trade unions and the 
Communist Party. For the primary sources, the reader may turn to works by scholars 
such as Michel Pigenet, Jean-Pierre Castelain and myself.4  
In the first strike considered here, there was little specifically Communist policy. 
A long metalworkers strike led to a citywide general strike in summer 1922, in which 
the dockers’ union participated actively. The PCF already existed for over a year but 
generally followed the local revolutionary syndicalist leadership.5 The Fourth Congress 
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 See for example, Stéphane Sirot, Le syndicalisme, la politique et la grève. France et Europe : XIXe-
XXIe siècles, Nancy : Arbre bleu éditions, 2011, 360 p. 
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 See John Barzman and Michel Pigenet, « Le miel et le fiel, ou le difficile cheminement des dockers vers 
l'unité », in Eric Wauters (ed.), Actes du colloque « Les Ports normands : un modèle ? », Mont-Saint-
Aignan : PURH, 1999 ; Michel Pigenet, « Le statut des dockers de 1947 », Cahiers de l’Institut Régional 
du Travail, 2000, pp.241-259 ; Jean-Pierre Castelain, Manières de vivre, manières de boire: alcool et 
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Paris I, 2000, publication expected in 2015). John Barzman, “Conflits et négociations au Havre avant et 
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 The interaction between the strike in Le Havre and the French and Russian Communist leaders is 
discussed in John Barzman, Dockers, métallos, ménagères: mouvements sociaux et cultures militantes au 
Havre 1913-1923, Rouen: PURH, 1997, pp. 341-346. 
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of the Communist International debated the event in great detail.6 According to French 
political scientist Bertrand Badie, this discussion was the beginning of a theorization of 
the use of strikes by the international communist movement, drawing on the 
revolutionary syndicalist tradition.7  Around 1910, Pierre  Monatte, editor of the 
revolutionary syndicalist review La Vie Ouvrière, had begun to theorize the need for 
conscious trade unionists to form, inside the majority unions, nuclei of more lucid 
activists who studied their industry and could take into account the national political 
scene.8 Faced with the creation of the Industrial Workers of the World in the United 
States, he had favored the strategy of “boring from within” the American Federation of 
Labor.  
But the Communist strike strategy also included a view inherited from the 
revolutionary social-democratic tradition that could occasionally consider strikes as 
political tools. In several countries, social-democratic parties called for mass strikes to 
advance the struggle for universal suffrage. In the same vein, the Basel Congress of the 
Second International in 1912 used the threat of a simultaneous general strike to ward off 
the danger of war. Conversely, political support for the war effort between 1914 and 
1918, generally meant abstaining from strikes. It is clear that according to this approach, 
the desirability of strikes should be judged not only from the standpoint of the workers 
in one industry, but from that of the “general interest” of all workers.9 What exactly was 
meant by the general interest of all workers remained to be clarified: did it apply to one 
country or the whole world? Did it mean the defense of the Soviet Union? Who decided 
in each conjuncture what this interest was? 
In any event, after the 1922 Comintern discussion, Communists in France and 
more generally in advanced capitalist countries with stable labor movements, were 
supposed to follow certain guidelines in their trade union and strike activity. As was the 
case for revolutionary syndicalists, Communists believed strikes should serve not only 
for immediate gains in one industry, but in a broader context, as practice for self-
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1999. 
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management and confrontation with the capitalist class.  Communists should prepare for 
such tests of strength a long time in advance, with care, by gathering information on the 
industry where they worked, testing the popularity of certain demands, proposals for the 
organization of the strike, building solidarity actions in neighborhoods, other industries 
and nationwide, and drawing political lessons about the state of the class struggle from 
each strike, whether an advance or a defeat. According to Bertrand Badie, this 
apprenticeship gave the PCF a real ability to become part of strike movements, an 
ability which was then used to stimulate, channel or hold back open conflict according 
to party policy.10 
The injunction to prepare strikes could have little effect in countries where 
Communist Parties were confined to intellectual circles or hounded out of cities by 
repression. But in countries with relatively democratic regimes such as France, it is 
undeniable that Communist Parties improved their ramifications and influence in the 
trade union movement. Nevertheless, it seems to us that Bertrand Badie exaggerates 
their ability to control strikes.  In some cases, strikes could break out or continue despite 
Communist reticence, in others, strikes might stop or fail despite Communist attempts 
to prolong them. 
The next four dockers’ strikes discussed here tend to illustrate the complex 
interplay of many political factors in Communist relations to strikes. 
In the dockers’ strike of 1928 in Le Havre, Communists only influenced a small 
minority of the participants, mainly in the coal-handling sector, which they had brought 
into the PCF-dominated national confederation, the CGTU.11 The vast majority of the 
close to seven thousand dockers followed a revolutionary syndicalist leadership around 
Jean Le Gall and belonged to a local confederation (the Union des syndicats autonomes) 
situated between the PCF-dominated CGTU and the reformist-led CGT. At the time of 
the strike, the Communists were on a confrontationist course with the local 
revolutionary syndicalist union leadership, which they denounced as reformist. Unions 
had been very weak since 1922. 
The union leadership decided to launch a full-scale strike on May 14, 1928, after 
employers tried to use the sliding scale of wages and a slight drop in everyday food 
prices to lower wages. The strike was well-organized and massive, and ended with an 
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 CGTU = Confédération générale du travail unitaire, founded in 1922 as a result of expulsions and 
walk-outs from the CGT. It included Communist Party followers and some independent forces.  
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agreement which the union leadership described as a great advance.12 Following a not 
uncommon tactic of signing a settlement which gave small wage increases but 
recognized the union, the strike leader, Jean Le Gall accepted the contract. To the 
contrary, the Communists denounced the contract as insufficient.13 But in reality the 
agreement proved to be a decisive turning point. After 1928, dockers refused to work 
with non-union laborers and, between 1928 and 1935, strengthened the union presence 
and obtained many concessions on wages and working conditions. 
When the national unification of trade unions (CGT, CGTU and Autonomes) 
took place in 1935 in the framework of the Popular Front, the Communists were forced 
to recognize the revolutionary syndicalist leadership around Le Gall not only as the 
leader of the local unified dockers’ union of Le Havre, but also of the Le Havre labor 
federation (Union des syndicats du Havre) and the national dockers’ federation 
(Fédération des Ports et Docks). This is the context for our next case study, the non-
strike of the Havrais dockers during the nationwide general strike of June 1936 
As is well-known, the Popular Front coalition won a majority in the legislative 
elections of May 1936, and rank-and-file workers, faced with hesitations by the new 
government led by Léon Blum, launched a general strike, the most massive yet in 
French history, distinguished by the widespread use of the sit-down tactic in factories 
(occupations d’usine). The dockers union in Le Havre abstained from participating in 
this national general strike, stating that dockers had already won the demands advanced 
by other corporations, namely union recognition, wage increases, and a shortening of 
the work day (more substantial in fact, than the national forty-hour week).14 The union 
did help workers in other industries to occupy their factories. Moreover, once general 
advances were won by all workers through new labor legislation, the dockers’ union 
engaged in late 1936 and in 1937, in several strikes to win further advances. During 
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1936 and 1937 Communists in the dockers’ union in Le Havre did not object to the 
tactic of the non-Communist union leadership. They concentrated their attention on 
organizing solidarity with Republican Spain through their own channels. In other 
industries in France where the unified unions were led by non-Communist forces, 
Communists sometimes tried to press for more action and won support on that basis. 
We have not found evidence of such Communist pressure for more militant action in the 
Le Havre cargo-handling industry in 1936-37. The Communist Party accepted the non-
Communist leadership’s tactics. Two explanations come to mind : the first is that the 
non-Communist union leadership conducted the trade-union struggle quite effectively 
and left little room for Communist criticism of its tactics, the second is that Communists 
took into account the “general interest of workers of the world” to unite in a broad anti-
fascist front and avoided embarrassing their non-Communist allies, even if the latter 
were reputedly “anarchist” provided the latter did not challenge their national and 
international plan. 
We skip the complicated events leading to the French declaration of war in 
September 1939 and the German occupation of Le Havre from June 1940 to September 
1944, to focus next on the immediate postwar period. In many countries, the 
accumulated discontent of the economic depression of the late 1930s and war-time 
sacrifices, even when self-imposed in the name of antifascism, finally erupted in a labor 
upsurge expressed in expansion of union membership and activism, strikes and 
demonstrations: this was the case in the United States, Britain, Sweden for example. In 
France, however, the same discontent did not lead to a strike wave; the Communist 
Party discouraged strikes until the onset of the Cold War (spring 1947), in the name of 
continuing the struggle against Nazi Germany, then of reconstructing France and 
facilitating the adoption of certain reforms by the coalition government in which the 
PCF had several ministers.  
Le Havre was heavily bombed then liberated by British and US forces in early 
September 1944. Thereafter, under the supervision of US military engineers and French 
civil servants, the port served as a major supply point for the Allied troops progressing 
against Germany until its surrender on May 8, 1945. During that time, the city was 
governed by a provisional commission including the Communist Party.15 Once the 
traffic had become relatively steady, dockers began to demand their traditional right of 
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taking home materials that had fallen on the ground as well as overtime pay for night 
and Sunday shifts.16 Despite food rationing, fuel shortages, substandard emergency 
housing and price inflation, these tensions did not lead to frequent strikes.17 The single 
work stoppage that appears in the records took place on the afternoon of May 8, after 
the news of victory had arrived and US authorities suspended a number of dockers 
charged with theft. To protest the unwarranted searches and punishment, five thousand 
dockers did not return to work and demonstrated massively the next day behind their 
traditional non-Communist leaders. The sub-prefect promised to rectify the problem. 
This took place after the first round of the municipal elections on April 29 and before 
the second round on May 13.  
The coalition in which the PCF stood lost the municipal elections of May 13, in 
part because of discontent with the provisional city government’s lack of attention to the 
emergency needs of the working population. The PCF and its allies argued that such 
sacrifices were necessitated by the struggle against fascism.  Despite its eviction from 
the Le Havre City government, the PCF remained interested in participating in national 
coalition governments and therefore in appearing as a factor of social peace.  Thus, 
when Havrais dockers decided on a ban on working on Sundays in May 1946, the PCF 
reported on the movement with some distance, preferring to glorify the dockers’ 
participation in the battle to keep France politically and economically independent and 
rebuild the port of Le Havre, despite the maneuvers of Vichy-supporters and the big 
corporations.18 
To summarize the 1945-1946 strike situation, one can say that the rank-and-file 
dockers returned massively to the union and expressed discontent with certain work 
regulations and the general price inflation, but resorted to stoppages on very rare 
occasions. The non-Communist, formerly anarcho-syndicalist union leadership around 
Jean Le Gall, seems to have preferred negotiations to strike action, except on one brief 
occasion when it was able to embarrass the city government in which Communists 
participated in May 1945, and another, later in May 1946, possibly to show its 
independence from the national government in which Communists participated. We 
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know from examination of internal union records that a major part of this non-
Communist leadership had conciliated the Vichy government and had to account for 
their behavior once Le Havre was liberated. Moreover, during the Vichy regime, it had 
begun negotiations on a new dock labor scheme that was made into law, with many 
labor-friendly additions, on September 6, 1947, so that, after Liberation, it focused its 
efforts on the promotion of this future law rather than strike action. In other words, it 
avoided a sustained head-on confrontation with the PCF in the name of serving the 
needs of the rank-and-file and defending trade union independence against government 
pressure, except on May 9, 1945, when it could score an easy point against the city 
government in which the PCF participated.  
During the same period, as we have seen the Havrais Communists tended to 
discourage labor conflicts in the port in the name of reconstructing the French economy. 
They were able to make a deal with the non-Communist dockers’ leadership for a 
division of spheres of influence in the labor movement: the Communists abandoned the 
local Havrais dockers’ union to the non-Communist leadership in exchange for the 
latter’s neutrality in political matters and acceptance of Communist leadership in other 
local unions and the national dockworkers’ federation. It is estimated that the non-
Communists had the support of approximately seven thousand dockers and the 
Communists, five hundred.19 The Communists decided to organize their supporters into 
cells, with a more political outlook, under the leadership of Albert Duquesnoy, and to 
include dockers among the eligible candidates of their slate in later municipal 
elections.20 Here, the Communist definition of the general interest of the workers, 
defined as reestablishing French independence, overrode the desire to gain influence 
among dockers as the best defender of their professional interests against their 
employers.  
Let us move forward some twenty-two years. Havrais dockers struck again 
during the May-June 1968 general strike in France. In the preceding two years, the 
national government led by De Gaulle was losing ground in the face of a rise of worker 
and youth discontent. Trade unions, including the national dockers’ union, were putting 
forward bolder demands. In Le Havre, the city government was led by the Communist 
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Party. The movement first gained momentum in the one-day general strike of May 13 
against repression of the student demonstrations. A few days later, a number of 
industries decided to continue or resume the strike, leading to a vast social movement 
and the largest general strike in French history. In Le Havre as elsewhere, the movement 
began among students and cultural workers and spread to automobile, shipbuilding and 
electrical workers around May 16, and a bit later to most other sectors. Dockers 
participated in a massive and disciplined show of strength. In each industry, the PCF-led 
CGT tried to channel the multi-faceted unfocused desire for change into winning a 
slightly augmented version of the last set of demands put forward by the trade unions. 
In the dockers’ union, the non-Communist leadership followed a similar approach. The 
Communists therefore participated in the strike of dockers and offered municipal 
facilities for meetings and rallies. Once a good compromise had been obtained on the 
various trade-union demands, they recommended an end to the strike. Differentiations 
occurred in some industries over the possibility of winning more than offered in their 
first proposal, or over the importance of prolonging the strikes, or some form of protest, 
until an initial political alternative to the Gaullist regime had been found. No such 
differentiation emerged in Le Havre or among dockers in any visible form. As a result, 
in this dockers’ strike, the Communists were undistinguishable from the non-
Communist leadership, both joining in the movement not too early, not too late, neither 
more militant nor more cautious, accepting the bounds set by the CGT national 
leadership. 
The non-Communist dockers’ leadership, guided at this time by Lucien Nolent, 
prided itself on having led a strike that gained new advances for the workers of the port 
transport industry, and having displayed solidarity with the rest of the working class. 
Quite naturally, the PCF had a more political and global explanation for its behavior in 
May and June 1968; it gave more attention to answering what it called its ultra-left 
critics. It argued that it had taken into account the general relationship of forces in 
France and had prevented a confrontation that was doomed to defeat, thus preserving 
the general interest of working people in France. The PCF and its leading union activists 
may have also tried to take into account the general interest of the workers from an 
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international point of view, involving the defense of French independence from the 
United States in the Cold War framework.21  
Our review of Communist policy in five dockers’ strikes in Le Havre shows that 
the immediate interests of the workers involved in the strike was not the only guiding 
principle of the party. In 1922, Communists participated without much specific strategy 
of their own, but nevertheless with a desire to win followers. In 1928, they criticized 
rather ineffectively the strike led by an anarcho-syndicalist leadership. In the three latter 
cases, 1936, 1945-46 and 1968, they accompanied the strike strategy of their non-
Communist allies at the head of the dockers’ union, but with political justifications 
which brought into play their own interpretation of the larger scene: the need to preserve 
a broad antifascist unity in 1936, to reconstruct the French economy in 1945-46, and to 
avoid uncontrolled militancy that might lead to a bloodbath and the end of the 
independent Gaullist foreign policy in 1968. The revamping of Communist Party work 
in the unions following the 1922 Comintern discussion may have enabled the party to 
influence strikes in France in general, as stated by Bertrand Badie, but, if so, the Le 
Havre dockers’ union was an exception, perhaps due to the PCF’s ineffective criticism 
in the formative strike of 1928, and its unpopular moderation when the established 
leadership was again in a weak position in 1945.  
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